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ABSTRACT
An 1 890s loan book of the Bank A. Levy permits a detailed examination of the lending
operations of a private bank in California during the National Banking Era (1 864-1914). This period
has been intensively analyzed at the macroeconomic level, but there are few microeconomic studies
of banks. This unregulated bank was well integrated into national money markets and lent to a broad
cross section of the community. Although the bank appeared to adhere to the real bills doctrine, it
provided medium term uncollateralized financing to business. The bank priced risk carefully,
offering rates equal to the lowest in the country to its best customers while charging extraordinarily
high rates to borrowers deemed risky. In the absence of modern accounting, close scrutiny of
borrowers' businesses and personal lives overcame the asymmetry of information between borrower
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whitefas-econ.rutgers.eduAlthough the literature on banking in the United States
during the late nineteenth century is voluminous, there is
relatively little work and much speculation about the actual
lending practices of banks.1 While federal and state regulators
collected and reported much valuable information about commercial
banks, most of their records concern aggregate balance sheets and
income statements. Using this data, the empirical work of
economic historians has been largely at the national and state
level, not at the level of individual banks. Microeconomic
studies of banking operations arerarer.Unfortunately,
individual banks' documents concerning their lending activities
are difficult to find or simply may not have survived.
The acquisition of the Bank of A. Levy, a prominent local
California bank, in 1995 by First Interstate led to the deposit
of its old banking records in the Ventura Country Museum of
History and Art. Among the nineteenth century records preserved
is one loan book. A. Levy's loan book provides an unusual window
to examine the banking practices of the period.The document
offers details about borrowers, interest rates, the size of
loans, duration, repayments and other characteristics. This
paper focuses on the lending operationsof the Bank of A. Levy as
a private bank, from its emergence in 1885 to1905 when it
obtained a state charter. Combining information from the loan
book with additional data on borrowers from the U.S. Census,
local business directories and voting records yields a pictureof
this one prominent local bank's commercial lending practices at
the turn of the nineteenth century.
'In contrast, there are several studies of antebellum banks.
See for example, Adams (1972) and Bodenhorn (1997) and (1999)
Crothers (1999) and Wright (1999)
21. The Origins of the Bank of A. Levy
Many banks in the American West were founded by merchants
who drifted into banking (Schweikart (1982) ,Dotiand Schweikart
(1991)) .Typically,these merchants had no special expertise in
banking but discovered that banking complemented and then
surpassed their commercial interests.The origins and early
development of the Bank of A. Levy follows this pattern.The
bank began as a private bank or unincorporated bank.The high
barriers to entry, notably the minimum capital requirements, set
by the National Banking Act of 1864 and the state banking laws
spurred the growth of these institutions between the Civil War
and the turn of the century (James (1978) ,White(1983))
On the frontier, especially in smaller communities, the
general store was often the center of business life and might
evolve into a private bank. Most private bankers combined some
other form of business with banking. The majority of these
institutions were very modest, reflecting the need to fill small
niches in the financial system. After 1890, states eased entry
requirements and many banned unincorporated banking, inducing or
forcing many private bankers to take out a state or national
charter (James, 1978) .TheBank of A. Levy sought and received a
state charter in 1905, reflecting both changes in state law and
its own continued growth.
The founder of the Bank of A. Levy, Achille Levy, was born
in Alsace to French Jewish parents in 1853.Following earlier
family emigrants, he left Alsace in 1871 for California. After
two years of commercial study in San Francisco, he was engaged as
a clerk and bookkeeper in the store of his uncle, Isidore Weill,
in Solano County.In 1873, Levy moved to the port city of
3Hueneme in Ventura County. Hueneme was the only major deep water
port between San Francisco and the Los Angeles port of San Pedro.
It was growing rapidly, serving as the point of export for the
rich agricultural county (Kramer and Stern, 1975)
By 1890, the county had a population of 10,071, according to
the U.S. Census.The predominance of men--5,88l--reflects the
fact that it was on the agricultural frontier. There were also a
large number of immigrants, 1,861, most of whom were European.
The census recorded 2185 dwellings.The 764 farms had 137,349
improved acres and 187,180 unimproved acres. In 1890, land,
fences and buildings were valued at $13 million.The estimated
value of the farm products in 1889 was $1.6 million. The
predominant crop was barley, followed distantly by wheat. A
scant 13 manufacturing establishments were reported with a total
capital value of $368,358.2
In Hueneme, Levy began a general merchandise business with
Moise L. Wolff, a distant relative. Levy also briefly served as
postmaster of the city in his store, thereby gaining a greater
business acquaintance. He became a naturalized citizen in 1876
and registered to vote in 1879.Levy was elected to the town
school board in 1890, served as a delegate to the County Board of
Supervisors, joined the Free Masons, and was activein the local
Republican Party (Kramer and Stern 1975)
In 1881, after six years of business with Wolff, Levysold
out his interest to his partner, returning briefly toFrance to
find a wife.Back in California, Levy set himself up as an
agricultural broker in grain, hay, fruits, nutsand other
2Eleventh Decennial Census of the United States, 1890. Vol.
I. Pou1ation, Part One, Vol. V. Retort on theStatistics of
Agriculture. Vol. VI. Retort on Manufacturing. Part One.
4produce. When farmers brought their produce to the wharf in
Hueneme,Levy was there, at the scales, to offer them the best
price based on telegraphed information from the San Francisco
Produce and Call Board, of which he was a member. Once a verbal
agreement was struck, Levy bought the farmer's produce and paid
for it with a receipt. Usually, the farmer did not collect the
full sale price but left the balance with Levy. These funds
could be drawn upon later to pay for supplies the farmer needed.
Farmers would issue a draft or check against balances with Levy
as payer (It's Been a Great Hundred Years, 1982)
Levy prospered by combining the functions of agricultural
broker and banker, expanding his range of banking activities,
accepting deposits and offering financial advice.He began an
important business relationship, when his first customer at the
bank, the manager of the huge Patterson Ranch, Charles J. Daily,
deposited his life savings of $480 on June 15, 1885. In
subsequent years, Levy served as the ranch's business and
financial advisor (A. Levy, 1991)
Levy's private banking operations were unregulated and his
high reputation among the county's farmers bolstered this new
line of business.Other Jewish merchants in the area---Moise
Wolff, Abraham Bernheim and Simon Cohn---conducted private
banking, but none were as successful as Achille Levy (Kramer and
Stern, 1975) .Thegrowth of all his businesses led Achille to
hire his recently arrived brother-in-law, Henri Levy, as general
bookkeeper in 1884 (A. Levy, 1991) .Thenext year, Levy increased
his independence by dissolving a partnership with Wolff who paid
him $57,500 for his share.
Although his business was operating in 1885 under a sign of
"A. Levy: Grain, Wool and Produce. Commission & Forwarding," Levy
5was now a serious banker.In the first records of Levy's banking
operations, April 1885-May 1886, he made loans to 90 customers.
These loans were concentrated among a few prominent farmers, with
four-sevenths of the loans going to 13 individuals. The $54,000
of loans generated $1,400 in interest earnings (A. Levy, 191)
While Levy's primary banking business was with farmers, he also
handled foreign exchange on all parts of Europe. His
correspondent bank was the London, Paris and American Bank, Ltd.
in San Francisco, owned by Lazard Frères of Paris (Kramer and
Stern, 1975)
Levy was an involved banker.He sought to expand local
agriculture and thereby improve his business as agricultural
broker.Initially, the most important crop in the county was
barley, which was shipped to Eastern breweries. However,
declining barley prices threatened the prosperous agricultural
community. Observing the success of lima beans, a Peruvian
import, Levy began a campaign in 1888 to persuade farmers to
switch from barley and hog raising to lima beans. The arrival of
the Southern Pacific Railroad in 1887 made it easier to ship
beans to Eastern markets, but the Hueneme wharf remained an
important shipment point for crops.In 1895, 26,000 tons left
the wharf, of which 60 percent were lima beans. The value of the
1895 lima bean crop was estimated to be $1.1 million.In the
mid-1890s, planting of sugar beets in the Oxnard plain began. By
1897, 1,000 acres were under cultivation, and shipmentsfrom Port
Hueneme jumped (A. Levy, 1991) .Thefollowing year, the Oxnard
Brothers built the American Beet Sugar Plant in Oxnard, which was
the largest structure in the county (Kramer and Stern, 1975)
Ventura County's agricultural expansion, with its demandfor
transportation required financing.The Bank of Ventura opened
6first in 1874, followed by the Bank of William Collins and Sons
in 1887, and the Bank of Hueneme and the State Bank of Santa
Paula (later the National Bank of Santa Paula) both in 1889.
Later, in 1900, the Bank of Oxnard, which became the National
Bank of Oxnard, was founded in 1900 with the objective of helping
the sugar beat industry.3 These were modestfinancial
intermediaries. In 1896, there were 31 national banks in
California, with $21.6 million in assets. The largest, the First
National Bank, San Francisco had $7.1 million in assets, compared
to the $184,415 of assets held by the First National Bank of
Santa Paula, the state's fourth smallest national bank (U.S.
Comptroller of the Currency, 1896)
While his own banking business was developing, A. Levy had
joined with several other businessmen, including SenatorThomas
Bard, to found the Bank of Hueneme, which had an initial capital
of $100,000. Levy was elected Vice President and bought $5000 of
stock.As an officer of the Bank of Hueneme, Levy was able to
further his own brokerage and banking business, obtaining
overdrafts from the Bank when required. By 1895, Levy established
himself as the premier local private banker, with a bank under
his name in a Main Street building between the mercantile store
of Lehmann and Waterman and the leading hotel (A. Levy,1991)
The Ventura Free Press (December 1895) commented: "His reputation
for square dealing is as wide as the county andthere is no
businessman more popular among the farmers." Levy was nowbetter
known as a banker than a broker. In 1901 he bought alot in the
town of Oxnard, inland from Hueneme, wherehe built a brick
building for his bank. Completed in 1902 itserved as the bank's
The Bank of William Collins and Sons failed, having
overextended its mortgage loans. Fairbanks, (1963), pp.3-7.
7office for the next quarter century.
In 1905, the bank was incorporated as a state regulated bank
with a capital of $200,000 and Levy as President. Intending to
keep ownership local and in his hands, Achille Levyand his wife
Lucy purchased 1,088 of the 2,000 sharesfor $108,800. Other
relations, provided another $28,000 of the capital and non-family
members, the remainder. Eventually, the Bank of A. Levybecame
the largest bank in the county, until Bank of Italy,forerunner
of the Bank of America planted a branch in the county inthe
1920s. When Levy died in 1922, he was the wealthiestindividual
in the county and paid the most income tax (Kramerand Stern
(1975) ,A.Levy (1991) ,"A.Levy, Country Pioneer is Called"
(1922))
The regulatory environment in which the Bank of A. Levy
operated between 1885 and 1905 was light forchartered banks and
virtually non-existent for private bankslike Levy's. Among
Western states, California was one of theearliest to adopt
general banking laws.In 1878, the state legislature required
banks to publish information about their financialcondition and
established a Board of Bank Commissioners. Commissioners
examined each bank twice yearly until 1905 but complainedthat.
the legislature ignored its reports andrecommendations.4 The
first time, the commissioners finally managed to inspectall 127
incorporated commercial and savings banksin 1888, they warned
about the dangerous practices they haddiscovered. The Board
wanted to examine the unincorporated banks, yetit had no power
to do so (Doti and Schweikart, 1994) .Thus,A. Levy's bank was
4One contemporary Ventura bank officer rememberedthat the
commissioners were "allpolitical appointments, men without
banking experience, and many of themcould not even balance the
cash," Fairbanks, (1963), p. 6.
8for all purposes, an unregulated, unexamined and unsupervised
bank until 1905.
2. Bank Lending
Among the extant bank records in the Ventura County Museum
is one loan book, "Notes and Bills Receivable."While other
studies of late nineteenth century banking have depended on
aggregate data reported to bank regulators, this document
provides an opportunity for a true microeconomic examination of
bank lending. The loan book records the 330 loans made or
obtained by Achille Levy from August 8, 1892 (loan 790) to
October 11, 1894 (loan 1119) .Mostof the loans were originated
and held by Levy; only 22 loans were purchased from other
lenders. The loan book records the name of the borrower, the sum
borrowed, the interest rate, the duration of the loan, the date
repaid, plus notes.
In the loan book, the borrower or "drawer" signed a bill or
note "in favor of" the "payee" who was Achille Levy, the banker.
These "bills" were not resold but were held until payment by
Levy.The loans were, in effect, unsecured promissory notes.
T. Russell Carroll, first bookkeeper and finally vice president
of the bank, described Levy as a disciple of the "characterloan"
method. If he determined that an applicant was of good
character, Levy was willing to lend large sumswith no
collateral.But, if he decided that a potentialborrower's
character was flawed, no loan would be offered no matterwhat the
collateral. According to Carroll, this character method helped
to ensure that Levy experienced few losses (Carroll(1958) ,
Levy(1991)) .Onhis visits to farmers, Levy carried a pocket-
sized notebook where he recorded his daily activitiesand
9indications of farmers' credit-worthiness.Unfortunately, the
absence of deposit records in the bank does not allow the linkage
of lending to any monitoring of borrowers by the activity of
their depository records. Furthermore, without these records it
cannot be determined whether borrower carried any compensatory
balances that may have altered the effective interest rate
charged to a borrower.
The character loan approach to lending was fairly typical of
country bankers' practices. Albert S. Bolles (1884) ,one
contemporary banking authority, found that country bankers often
did not ask for collateral but based their loans on their long
acquaintance with customers. An intimate personal knowledge of
the borrower's business and personal character was necessary in
the absence of reliable financial statements.Accountants had
little authority to impose standardized accounting procedures on
clients and there were few statutory requirements for accounting
in this period. To compensate for the asymmetry of formal
information between borrower and lender, bankers needed close
personal ties.Only when financial accounting began to develop
did a few urban banks begin in the 1890s to use financial
statements to evaluate borrowers (Moulton (1918) ,Brief(1966) /
White(1998)
Much of modern banking theory (Battacharya and Thakor
(1993), White (1998)) builds on the asymmetry of information
between borrowers and lenders.Investing in the acquisition of
information on their customers allows banks to provide credit to
new borrowers, poor credit risks and evenestablished borrowers
who want to signal creditworthiness to the market. This
distinctive function is often heralded as the
"special"
characteristic of banking. The Bank of A. Levy was a special
10lender in this sense. Some of its customers might have sold a
promissory note to another local resident, but none could have
entered the national commercial paper market, leaving them
dependent on bank for most of their financial needs.
The loans of the Bank of A. Levy were typical of many small
banks. The total value of the 330 loans granted in the loan book
was $124,120.34. Although the average size loan was $376, there
was considerable variation in the size of the loans offered.
Figure 1 shows the size distribution of loans, which ranged from
$5 to $5244 with a mode of $21 to $100.The relatively modest
size of these loans was similar to other small banks. The
Comptroller of the Currency (1880) reported that the average size
loan for country national banks in the Western and Midwestern
states was $713.
Almost all nineteenth century banking theorists concurred
that bank loans should be structured to meet the dictates of the
real bills doctrine. This theory held that banks should take
only short-term loans to finance the production or shipmentof
goods, whose final sale would be used to pay off the loan.The
bill of exchange was usually regarded as the appropriate and safe
instrument for this form of intermediation.Proponents of the
real bills doctrine claimed that if banks followed its
prescription, loans would be restricted to the legitimateneeds
of business, and banks would remain liquid.5 Short-term loans,
promptly paid at maturity would reduce the problemof a maturity
mismatch with deposits and limit a bank's exposure to panic. Yet,
the Bank of A. Levy's loans did not follow the prescriptionof
In this period, liquidity meant that an asset would be
immediately paid off at maturity, not that it was easy tomarket.
White (1998)
11the real bills doctrine.The loans were not double name but
single name paper.6 No protection was offered by a second name,
nor was there any collateral.
Figure 1
Size Distribution of Loans (330 Loans)
But the loans did follow the spirit of the real bills
doctrine in that they were nominally short term loans. The vast
majority--283 loans---were one day loans. The initial loan
maturities are shown in Figure 2. Some time loans, with
maturities as long as a year or more were given, but the banker's
61t is interesting to note that Pacific and Western banks












$214100 S101.$200 S201.$500 $50141000 $1001.$5244clear preference was for one day loans. The one day loan made
the bank appear to be nominally quite liquid, as in theory Levy
could call the loans for repayment at one day's notice. These
loan maturities closely matched the initial maturities of A.
Levy's borrowed funds.One "Notes and Bills Payable" book for
September 26, 1894 (Bill No. 47) to September 1, 1904 (Bill No.
195a) is also held by the Ventura County Museum. Almost allwere
nominallyone-day loans. Levy's correspondent bank supplied most
of these funds, with occasional borrowing from the Bank of
Huenemeand other private banks.
Figure 2
Initial Loan Maturities (330 Loans)
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Actual Duration of Loans (317 Loans)
However, this near match of maturity was an illusion.
Levy's loans seem to have been automatically rolled overand
there is no evidence in the loan book that any were called before
the borrower was ready to repay the debt. It appears thatthe
automatic rolling over of a loan was understood as the payment
period for most one day loans was set at one percent per quarter.
Figure 3 shows the actual duration for 317loans. There were 13
loans for which it was not possible to determine whenthe loan
was repaid. The average duration of a loan was279 days or about
nine months.7 The modal range in Figure 3 is between fourmonths









Daysand one year.There was very little amortization of the loans
made by the Bank of A. Levy.On all but 31 of the loans, the
principal was paid off in its entirety at the end of the loan.
For a few loans some irregular payment on the principal was made
before the loan was concluded.
The actual maturities on A. Levy's loans appear to have been
quite long by standards of the period. According to most
contemporary banking authorities, most loans at the turn of the
nineteenth century ran for 30, 60 or 90 days, although they were
certainly considering nominal not actual maturities.In a 1913
study, the Comptroller of the Currency found that 57 percent of
all bank loans were made with maturities of less than ninety
days. John James (1978) concluded that it was relatively rare to
see loans longer than six months and one year seemed to bethe
upper bound.He believed the average maturity to be 60 days.
Yet, it was widely known that many commercial loans, maybe 40 to
50 percent of unsecured loans in large cities, were renewed at
maturity (Moulton, 1918) .Somelimited evidence on country bank
practices suggests that agricultural loans typically ranfor
three to nine months (James, 1978) .TheBank of A. Levy's
practices may thus have been in line with standardcommercial
practice. Being unregulated it did not feel obligedto conceal
the fact that it ignored the real bills doctrine andmade long-
term uncollateralized loans.
The interest rates charged on the loans varied enormously.
As seen in Figure 4, which reports the interest rate frequencies
for 305 loans, the annual interest rate for 197 loans was4
percent.8 Twenty loans bore 5 percent and 33 loans6 percent.
8For 21 mostly purchased loans, the rate of interest was not
possible to calculate with the informationin the loan book.
15Under California law, there was no usury rate, and a surprising
39 loans were charged 40 percent (Holmes and Lord, 1895) .The
average rate for the whole portfolio was 7.32 percent, a




Annual Interest Rates Charged (305 Loans)
Cautious as Achille Levy might be, he still sustained some
losses from his loans.10 Seven loans produced lossesthat had to
be absorbed by the bank, being "charged toP&L." These loans
9Holmes and Lord, (1895) ,p.170.
'°For five loans it was not possible to determine if the
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Psrcsntrepresented a total loss of $2,742.Losses on the loans ranged
from a high of $1640 to $74.The rates charged at the outset
seemed no guide as five loans were at 4 percent, one was at6
percent and one was at 40 percent.Another seven loans were
charged to the borrowers' deposit accountswhen they failed to
repay their debts. Theseloans totaled $2655, with the largest
loan being $2120.In addition, there was one loan for $30.50
that was apparently granted free of interest.
3. Money Market Integration
In nineteenth century America, there wasconsiderable
variation in short-term regional interest rates. R.M.
greckenridge (1898) compiled the average weeklyrates of discount
from selected cities, for 1893-1897, as reportedin Bradstreet's.
These rates were supposed to represent thelocal discount rate on
loans of high quality prime, double-name paper.Rates in the New
England cities averaged 4.9 percent,4.9 percent in the East, 7.3
percent in the South, 6.4in the Midwest, 9.0 percent in the
West, and 8.6 in the Pacific States.The average rate was 6.2
percent in San Francisco and 7.1 percentin Los Angeles. While A.
Levy's average of 7.32 percent certainly
"fits"this region, it
is somewhat misleading because thestandard rate for loans was
clearly 4 percent.
The high rates for the Pacific region are acommon finding.
In his seminal paper, Lance Davis(1965) found a substantial
interest rate premium persisted forthe West Coast as late as
the 1890s, with a proxy for interest rates,well above 8 percent
for that decade. John James (1978) computedregional interest
rates to study interest ratedifferentials. For the West during
the period which A. Levy's book covers,James' semi-annual rates
17were 1892 II: 8.1, 1893 I: 8.8, 1893 II: 7.3, 1894 I: 5.8, 1894
II: 7.4 percent. Interestingly, the modal rates charged by A.
Levy are closer to the average rates for the East, around 4
percent for these years. Most recently, Howard Bodenhorn (1995)
provided alternative regional interest rate estimates.For the
West, his weighted rates were 1892: 9.24, 1893: 11.42, and 1894:
9.44 percent.
These rates, which are estimates not actual interest rates,
seem remarkably high compared to most of the actual rates
reported by Achille Levy. To offer a better comparison of Levy's
rates with the estimates produced by Davis, James, and Bodenhorn,
I used their procedure for estimating the interest rate on the
Bank of A. Levy data. For the 305 loans where there is complete
data, I calculated the interest revenue on each loan (the value
of the loan times the yearly interest rate times the fraction of
years the loan was outstanding--atotal of $21,775)and
subtracted the loan losses. The estimated interest rate on loans
was then obtained by dividing the resulting figure bythe value
of the loans. The estimated rate of interest from this procedure
was 15.3 percent.This very high figure fits into the picture
drawn by Davis, James and Bodenhorn.One would expect that a
rural county between the financial centers of Los Angelesand San
Francisco would have higher rates than the state or regional
average. However, this high numberis the result of a relatively
small number of borrowers paying interest as high as 40 percent,
when the large majority paid as low as four percent.What Levy's
loan book suggests is that the risky borrowers had to pay penalty
rates for credit. Their interest payments are what boosted
interest earnings and the apparently high estimatedinterest
rate.Was Ventura County not well integrated intofinancial
18markets? Most of Levy's borrowers found credit available at 4
percent.For these individuals, the market supplied loans at
nationally low rates---rates close to the estimated rates for New
England and the Northeast.
Levy apparently could tap into the regional market for funds
through his correspondent bank.He made frequent use of the
market to fund his lending operations.One indication is the
"Bills and Notes Payable" for 1895.In this year, Levy borrowed
a total of $40,255 in 36 loans, all but fourof which were at 6
percent. Given an average term of 199 days, Levy's average
outstanding borrowing in 1895 was $26,420. The average valueof
loans outstanding per year for 1892-1894 was approximately
$47,000, after adjusting for maturity. Thus, Levy seems tohave
funded over half of his lending with borrowed funds.The actual
interest cost of those funds was $1661.If this were the actual
cost of all funds (it is not for the same time period) ,thetotal
cost would be $2225.The average annual earnings for 1892-1894
were $8318, implying an approximate rateof return of nearly 13
percent.
4. The Pricing of Loans
As an alleged disciple of character loans, Levywould have
set loan rates with a knowledge of therisks presented by his
customers. There is no indication ofrisk in the loan book and
Levy's pocket notebooks do not appear tohave survived. To
recover some information on how Levyset loan rates, an
econometric analysis of the loans using data fromthe loan book,
the census, and other sources was carried out.
The cost of funds might have influencedthe loan rates.
Thus, the current and one month lagged NewYork commercial paper
19rates were included in the regressions.11 The term of the loan
may have been another consideration.The initial or nominal
maturity first entered in the loan book was used. Steady
customers were measured by the number of times an individual had
previously borrowed. The dollar value of the loan or the dollar
value of all loans a borrower had outstanding could have
influenced the loan rate. Multiple borrowers may have provided
additional protection for repayment of the loan. Levy purchased
some loans and this fact was included. The age of the borrower
and whether the borrower was identified by his or her surname as
Mexican were included as possible factors.Additional sources,
notably the 1900 manuscript federal census for Ventura County
provided information on whether an individual owned or rented
property, had a mortgage, was native or foreign born, or was
married.
Table 1 reports the results of the OLS regressions.
Characterizing the dependent variable, the interest rate, as a
continuous variable is not quite appropriate, as there were only
nine values. It is also not practical to model the determination
of the interest rate as an ordered probit, given the number of
rates.Instead, interest rates were grouped as low and high
risk. Rates were "high"if they exceeded 7 percent andlow"
if they fell below 7 percent, yielding a 1 or a 0 for the
dependent variable for the probits reported in Table 2.In both
tables, regressions 1 and 2 used the full sample for which loan
rates were available, with either the dollar value of the
specific loan or the value of all loans outstanding. These were
not used in the same regression as they were highly correlated.
11Banking and MonetarY Statistics, (1943) ,TableNo. 120, p.
448.
20The third and fourth regressions include the
variables, for which there were fewer observations.
Table 1
The Determination of Loan Rates
OLS Estimates
additional
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant
commercial Paper Rate (t)
commercial Paper Rate (t-1)
Initial Maturity (days)
Times Previously Borrowed
Dollar Value of Loan

















































































































The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
21The number in parentheses are approximate t-statistics.
22
Table 2
The Determinants of Loan Rates
Probit Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4
Constant -0.032 0.025 0.933 0.413
(-0.06) (0.05) (0.56) (0.27)
-7.602 -9.996 34.442 31.043
(-0.66) (-0.86) (1.32) (1.21)
-7.141 -4.639 -38.49-35.539
(-0.58)(-0.38)(-1.299)(-1.206)
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(1.77) (1.48) (1.16) (1.18)
-0.398 -0.446 -0.634 -.0644
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-112.8In all four regressions, the varying costs of the money
market, which moved considerably in this period from 4.94to
10.14percent,had no influence on the loan rates. This result
is perhaps not surprising as Levy seems to have held his base
loan rate constant at 4 percent for two years and his cost of
funds for 1895 remained constant at 6 percent. The initial
maturity of the loan had little apparent effect on the rate
charged in the OLS regression, but the probit estimates are a bit
sharper.In Table 2's regressions 1 and 2, the coefficients
suggest that a higher initial maturity raised rates, implying a
positive yield curve.
One indication of reputation, the number of times an
individual had previously borrowed was an important variable,
reducing the loan rate significantly. Another important variable
was the size of the loan, measured either by the individual loan
or all outstanding loans to one borrower. The larger the value
of the loan(s) outstanding, the higher the rate charged.
Contrary to the claim that a borrower with good character could
costlessly increase his or her credit, the OLS regression
suggests that every additional $1000 raised the rate by onetenth
of a percent. Multiple signatories to the loan, whether it was
purchased or whether it was repaid had no apparent effect onthe
loan rate.The age of the borrower appears to have had some
effect in lowering the cost of the loan. Age may be a proxy for
some measure of reputation or wealth. None of theother factors,
farm ownership, renting, foreign born or married, helped to
explain the variation in loan rates.
While these regressions offer some evidence that reputation,
measured by repeated borrowing or age, and risk, in terms of the
size of the loan, influence the loan rate, they do not yieldmuch
23insight into the risks that A. Levy observed.Ten percent a
quarter or 40 percent a year was Levys rate for risks, and it.
was used for many different occasions.Some one time borrowers
were charged 40 percent.Pedro Chanchorena, M. Kujawsky, and
George C. Smith were all charged 40 percent for their initial
loans; but once they repaid, their subsequent rates dropped to 4
or 5 percent. A sudden increase in borrowing needs could drive
the rate for an individual up.William Reilly was charged 4
percent on his first loan of $125, 40 percent on the second loan
of $1600, and finally 4 percent again on the third loan of $275.
John Glinchy had borrowed five times at 4 percent on small loans
but his final loan of $1000 gave him a rate of 40 percent,
perhaps as his risk increased.Finally, there were customers
like Julius Alvord whose four loans totaling $2787 all bore the
same 40 percent rate. The regressions do note easily pick up the
factors leading Achille Levy's shifts in rates from 4 to 40 or 40
to 4 percent, but one may surmise that changes in risk drove
these adjustments.
5. Who Borrowed?
Studying early nineteenth century New England banks, Naomi
Lamoreaux (1994) found that many were founded with the purpose of
financially assisting the bank owners' and directors' business
operations.Providing a circle of credit, insider lending was
pervasive, and only in the later part of the century did banking
slowly become more professional and begin to eliminate what today
would be considered conflicts of interest. While A. Levy was
operated on a frontier with many closely intersecting business
interests, he provided most of the capital for the bank in its
early years and insider lending of the New England variety was
24not an issue. The loan book has no recorded loan to any member of
the extended Levy family for the years 1892-1894.Only Pchille
Levy's former business partner,Moise Wolff,obtaineda
relatively small loan.In fact, some small loans were given to
Levy's rival brokers. Lending appears to have gone to
creditworthy customers, mostly large and some small.
In the nearly two year period that this loan book covers,
Levy made 330 loans to a total of 176 borrowers. However, many
clients borrowed repeatedly. There were 71 borrowers who
borrowed more than once during this period. Their loans
represented the lion's share--$86,270 of the $124,120 loans that
Levy made. Figure 5 shows the number of borrowers who had
anywhere from two to eight loans, while Figure 6 showsthe dollar
value of the multiple loans. Levy was clearly providing
continuous financing of many farmers in Ventura County. Some,
like the Donlon Brothers or Bicente Duralde, received substantial
credits, totaling $4685 (4loans) and $3016 (5 loans)
respectively. For others, there was modest but sustainedcredit.
In five loans, John Grainger obtained a total of $500;and
Christopher Robinson $75.These loans often overlapped, again
suggesting that Levy gave continuous financing tohis customers.
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While his borrowers were certainly not a cross section of
Ventura County, they were a diverse group. Levy did not record
personal information on any of his borrowers, however some idea
of who they were was obtained by matching the borrowers with the
1900 Census for Ventura County. Although there were one or two
exceptions all the borrowers were men, and according to the
Census of 1900, all those who were matched were literate. For
occupations, there were 89 matches, which reveal that Levy's
clientele was predominantly the farming community.Sixty-nine
were farmers, three were brokers or merchants, and two werestock
farmers.For the remainder there was one carpenter, bartender,
owner of a farmers' market, foreman, insurance agent, laundryman,
lighthouse keeper/inventor, notary/real estate agent,restaurant
26
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Value of Multiple Loans
The matches with the 1900 manuscript census give some
information about their ownership of property.Fifty-four had
farms, of which ten were owned outright, twenty-one were
mortgaged and the remainder were rented. There were an
additional thirteen homeowners, seven of whom owned their
property outright, two had mortgages andthree rented.
The bank's clientele was surprisingly young.Most of the
men, forty-six, were in their twentieswith another thirty in
their thirties.It is difficult to compare this youthful group
with the population of the county as a whole. However,it may




6 8Ventura County records 77 percent of the white male population
between the ages of 18 and 44.
While Achille Levy certainly gave loans out to his business
friends, his clientele included many beyond his personal circle
as indicated by the loans to his Hispanic clients. Eleven
borrowers with Spanish surnames took out 38 loans, totaling
$20,423.12 Although these were only one tenth of the total, they
accounted for about one fifth of the value. The biggest borrower
in this category was Pedro Chanchorena who took out one loan for
$4000 and another for $1600.Several others--Burucoa, Duralde,
and Salaberry--took out loans for over $l000.'There were,
however, some modest loans for as little as $17 to Miguel
Videgain, a sheep herder.Although almost all the large non-
Hispanic borrowers appeared in the Census or in the voter
registration records, none of the Hispanic borrowers except the
sheep herder could be found. The big loans, suggestive of fairly
large farmers, makes this absence surprising; and they may have
been residents of another county.
Demand for labor on the expanding agricultural frontier was
high, and the Chinese came to Ventura County in large numbers to
work in the fields. A Chinatown grew up in Ventura, and some
immigrants opened small businesses.Racial antipathy to the
Chinese ran high in the American West in the late nineteenth
century.An Anti-Chinese League was formed in Ventura in 1885
and a mass meeting was held at a union hall the following year.
The league complained (Jennings, 1984) that "itis not fair that
120ne other loan for $100 had as a second borrower, Adolfo
Camarillo.
13Levy's spelling of Spanish names was unconventional at
times.
28white laboring men and women cannot gain employment instead o
the Chinese." The Chinese community was subsequently intimidated
by the police, and punitive taxes were levied on laundries.
Dislike of the Chinese spilled over into the census. The census
taker for Ventura Country was careless and hurried in recording
the information on the Chinese population, making it impossible
to distinguish names.
Local hostility to the Chinese did not prevent Levy from
offering them some modest loans. Ha Kay Chang received a one-day
$50 loan at 2 percent quarterly, which he repaid in 70 days.
Although this rate was fairly high, it appears that repayment may
have eased subsequent terms.After Ah Gow Wong obtained his
first loan, a one-day $50 loan at 2 percent quarterly, and repaid
it in 108 days, he got a one-day $100 loan at 1.5 percent
quarterly, which was repaid in 59 days. While he still had this
loan out, Wong borrowed another $100 at the same rate for 88
days. Wong, a local farmer, borrowed even larger sums from the
Bank of Hueneme, obtaining $2,000 to $3,000 on crop mortgages
(Fairbanks (1963) ,Jennings,(1984))
6. Conclusion
Although the Bank of A. Levy was modest even by the
standards of country national banks, it was a well-developed
commercial banking establishment by the turn of the nineteenth
century. The bank fulfilled the financing needs of an expanding
agricultural community and made loans to a broad cross sectionof
the county. Loans were simple uncollateralized promissory notes
that were made on the banker's judgment of the character and risk
of the borrower. Loan rates varied considerably with the
29perceived reputation and risk of the borrower.Integrated into
the money market, the loan portfolio was funded by the bank's
capital, and a significant infusion of borrowed funds. Although
the average or estimated aggregate loan rates were apparently
high, the modal borrower obtained credit at 4 percent, a rate
comparable with some of the best rates in the country.
Nevertheless, the risky loans and the high rates paid on them
enabled the bank to enjoy an overall high rate of return.
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